Objectives: Metropolitan areas must be prepared to manage large numbers of casualties related to a major incident. Most US cities do not have adequate trauma center capacity to manage large-scale mass casualty incidents (MCIs). Creating surge capacity requires the distribution of casualties to hospitals that are not designated as trauma centers. Our objectives were to extrapolate MCI response research into operational objectives for MCI distribution plan development; formulate a patient distribution model based on research, hospital capacities, and resource availability; and design and disseminate a casualty distribution tool for use by emergency medical services (EMS) personnel to distribute patients to the appropriate level of care.
M etropolitan areas must be prepared to manage large numbers of casualties related to a major incident. Examples of these types of incidents include the marathon bombing in Boston, Massachusetts, 1 and the terror attacks in Paris, France, 2 San Bernardino, California, 3 Brussels, Belgium, 4 Orlando, Florida, 5 and Berlin, Germany. 6 Most US cities do not have adequate trauma center capacity to manage large-scale mass casualty incidents (MCIs). To create surge capacity, there will be a need to distribute casualties to hospitals that are not designated as trauma centers.
The number of people who are killed immediately at a scene varies widely, but the number of critically injured survivors is relatively small and has proven to be relatively consistent. It is well established that taking patients who are critically injured to trauma centers can result in a reduction in mortality. When applied to mass casualty responses, damage-control principles reduce resource utilization and optimize surge capacity. 7 This article examines the supporting evidence and methodologies for the implementation of a mass casualty distribution tool for use by emergency medical services (EMS) personnel at the scene of these incidents.
MCIs occur with regular frequency. MCIs are events that generate more patients at one time than locally available resources can manage. 8 These MCIs create a surge of patients that must be managed. These events can be the result of natural disasters, transportation accidents, mass violence (mass shooting), or terrorism, and can be classified as simple, compound, compensated, or uncompensated. The commonality for these classifications is that the number of casualties overwhelms medical capacity. 9 Mass casualty planning presents a conundrum for the US medical system. Events such as the Patriots' Day marathon bombing in Boston and the mass shootings in Paris, France, Brussels, Belgium, and San Bernardino, California have demonstrated that widescale bloodshed can be generated by a few individuals using inexpensive equipment and minimal resources. Nationally, the present trauma system is under constant strain; an evaluation of national hospital emergency surge capacity has found major gaps in the ability to absorb an event paralleling the train bombing attacks in Madrid, Spain, which resulted in >1800 victims.
10 Nevertheless, the systems-level responses to the events in Boston and Paris demonstrate that well-constructed, well-executed plans to distribute casualties across a health system can be used effectively to save the lives of victims of terrorism.
There have been common lessons learned in each of these mass casualty events. These lessons include the need to control and secure the incident sites, establishment of incident command, definition of clear roles and responsibilities, use of onsite triage to inform clinical priorities for victims, and establishment of clear lines of communication. 11 Atlanta, Georgia has been the site of several MCIs during the past 20 years, such as the Centennial Olympic Park bombing, the Atlanta day trader shootings, and the Bluffton bus accident. There were 111 victims of the Centennial Olympic Park bombing, who were distributed among 11 local hospitals and 1 regional trauma center. 12 Despite its success with these events, metropolitan Atlanta has an inadequate amount of trauma centers-two level I trauma centers, three level II trauma centers, and one level I pediatric hospital 13 -for a region that encompasses approximately 8700 mi 2 and 6 million people. A report by the Georgia State Senate Research Office found that there was no comprehensive trauma system in the state and that there were an inadequate number of trauma beds. They also found that under normal trauma volumes, the death rate for trauma was 20 times greater than the national average.
14 Recognizing the limitations that the state of trauma care places on preparation for MCIs, we sought to develop protocols to respond to MCIs within those constraints.
Our objectives with this project were to extrapolate mass casualty response research into operational objectives for mass casualty distribution plan development; formulate a patient distribution model based on research, hospital capacities, and resource availability, which defines numbers of casualties by triage category that can be managed at each facility within the region; and design and disseminate a casualty distribution tool for use by EMS personnel to distribute patients to the appropriate level of care.
Methods and Results
Despite the limitations to the trauma system, Georgia does have several advantages that have assisted the effort to plan for MCIs. In the wake of medical surge created by the influx of victims from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the Georgia Department of Public Health, in partnership with the Georgia Hospital Association, created 14 regions, each led by a regional coordinating hospital (RCH). RCHs steer the preparedness efforts of the healthcare coalitions in the state and receive funds from the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response in the form of Hospital Preparedness Program grants. During region-wide disasters and hospital-based medical responses, the RCHs serve as the primary logistical hub and have been used to great effect in coordinating responses to local disasters.
The RCH system was active during notable events such as the tornado that struck downtown Atlanta in 2008 during college basketball's Final Four and the snowstorm that paralyzed the city in 2014. The RCH network also was used to coordinate the reception and distribution of medical refugees after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
Most of the hospitals that would receive patients from a mass casualty in the city are located in RCH region D (Grady Memorial Hospital) and region N (WellStar Kennestone Hospital). In addition, Children's Healthcare of Atlanta (Egleston) serves as the specialty coordinating hospital for the coordination of pediatric care across the state.
In 2015 the Georgia Office of EMS and Trauma adopted Model Uniform Core Criteria-compliant triage as the system of choice for EMS providers across the state. 15 An example of Model Uniform Core Criteria-compliant triage is the Sort, Assess, Lifesaving Interventions, and Treatment/Transport system, which has been endorsed by the American College of Emergency Physicians. Although there is risk for undertriage with MCIs, using components of these standards and mapping them to resource availability in a manner that absorbs the casualties based on severity without overwhelming a single hospital's resources should result in better outcomes. 16 A series of three meetings was conducted with administrative and clinical leadership from the hospital emergency departments (EDs) and EMS leadership within regions D and N in an effort to reach consensus on the numbers of patients that they could absorb in their EDs with little or no notice in the event of an MCI. A review of the management of the bombings in Madrid and London reflects that the number of critically injured survivors is relatively small and has proven to be relatively consistent, averaging 7% to 10%. 7 Using damage control surgical techniques and focusing resources on this subset of critically injured patients reduce mortality. 7 During these meetings research data were shared that supported the proposed framework described herein and illustrated how focusing on damage control techniques and appropriate casualty distribution could reduce mortality.
Three essential agreements were reached. First, each hospital in the region was assessed by its own departments of emergency management, emergency medicine, and surgery. The hospitals then submitted the number of each type of patient that could be accepted under the Sort, Assess, Lifesaving Interventions, and Treatment/Transport triage system. Hospital representation designated the primary trauma hospitals of the region as the only receiving facilities for "red," or immediate, triage-level patients. Hospitals without trauma capacity were selected to receive "green," or nonurgent triage-level patients. "Yellow," or urgent triaged patients, were divided among the RCHs based on bed capacity and the presence of surgical and subsurgical representation at the facility. Special attention also was noted regarding the hospital's ability to accept helicopter transports. This information then was collated and used to create a planning rubric that was distributed to local EMS agencies and discussed later. The regions' MCI ED surge capacity tool can be reviewed at http://links.lww.com/SMJ/A76.
Second, no hospital in the affected regions would be allowed to divert incoming ambulances for the duration of the MCI. Ambulance diversion is a national problem. 17 The practice was designed originally to provide for temporary relief of incoming patients for EDs, which were operating at full capacity. It has become commonplace and has been demonstrated to lead to prolonged offload times for incoming ambulances. 17 Allowing diversion also would affect the regional plan significantly and negatively. The hospitals agreed that any hospital that had become overrun with victims who had self-transported would be removed from consideration to receive victims by EMS. This ensured that each hospital would not be held responsible for both local surge conditions and the greater regional response.
Third, the regional hospitals and EMS agreed to provide each director of an RCH with updated information regarding important operational contacts within each organization. This database is used to run two distributed communication tools: a multimodal messaging platform and a cloud-computing-based incident tracking and management tool. The communications tools are tested on a regular basis and have been used to communicate events such as major weather systems that have regional impact.
As part of the partnership between the regional EMS providers and the RCHs, a triage distribution tool was created using the triage plan agreed to by the RCHs. The tool is a 24-Â 36-inch laminated form with grommets in the top corners, so that it can be hung from a command vehicle. The form lists all of the regional hospitals, the county in which they are located, their helipad capability, and the numbers of patients by triage level that they can accept on the first pass. The tool is used with a grease pencil so that the responders who are managing patient transport on the scene of an MCI can cross through numbers to track which patients have been transported to each hospital. The concept of operations for the use of the tool also is included on the form for quick reference. Initial training and subsequent "train the trainer" workshops were conducted through the leadership of the regions' EMS.
The triage distribution tool has been incorporated into regional planning exercises, encompassing both large-scale transportation accidents and multipronged terrorist attacks (similar to the shooting and bombing attacks in Mumbai, India in 2008 18 ). The tool has been used to redistribute EMS traffic based on a scenario in which multiple area hospitals were overrun with local casualties. The tool was distributed to a variety of medical responders who were recruited to serve as first responders for a regional marathon race with approximately 30,000 attendees.
Discussion
The approach to this project was to create a plan for ED surge capacity to manage an event that resulted in approximately 500 patients; this is in contrast to the bombings in Madrid   19 and London, 7 which produced 1800 and 750 patients, respectively. The MCIs in Paris and Brussels resulted in approximately 300 patients each.
2,4 Mortality figures vary based on the scale of the incident.
Local EDs continue to struggle with existing patient volumes. Although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PL 111-48) has increased the number of patients with health insurance coverage, it is unclear whether increased healthcare coverage actually will translate into increased access to primary care. Patients, as consumers, also tend to use EDs based on their sense of urgency. The data support an increase in local ED utilization. 20 Reports from the Institute of Medicine present an action agenda for improving emergency care in the United States and include two of the following recommendations: develop a coordinated, regionalized, accountable system and end ED boarding and diversion. 21 Neither of these recommendations has come to fruition in our area. EDs continue to operate at capacity, admitted patients are boarded daily in these departments, and hospitals are frequently functioning on diversion. This galvanizes the need to create meaningful and functional surge capacity plans that can be implemented in short-or no-notice MCIs.
Conclusions
Metropolitan areas must be prepared to manage large numbers of casualties related to a major incident. Because of the large numbers of casualties that large-scale events can produce, hospitals and EMS organizations must take a systematic approach to develop surge planning. Planning for an MCI must take an "all hazards" approach to ensure that the plan is adaptable and scalable, regardless of the type or cause of the MCI.
The creation and implementation of a mass casualty surge plan and patient distribution tool for EMS can be used as a method to distribute patients in no-notice events. Targeted distribution of casualties to hospitals designated as trauma centers and the use of damage-control principles when applied to mass casualty responses reduce resource utilization and optimize surge capacity. Directing critically ill patients among the designated trauma centers has the potential to reduce mortality associated with the event. Our approach has demonstrated that a
